European Court of Human Rights
14 September 2021
Facts
In a previous judgment in Volodina v. Russia, the Court held that the applicant had been both physically and psychologically ill-treated by her former partner S. and that the authorities had failed to comply with their obligations under the Convention to protect her from his abuse. It concluded that the existing Russian legal framework had been deficient in several important respects and had failed to meet the requirements inherent in the State’s positive obligation to establish and apply effectively a system punishing all forms of domestic violence.
Complaint
The applicant complained that the Russian authorities had failed to protect her from repeated acts of cyberviolence from S. for at least 3 years. This included the publication of her intimate photographs without consent, impersonation through the creation of fake social media profiles and tracking her with the use of a GPS device. She also complained that the authorities had failed to conduct an effective investigation into these acts.
Court’s ruling
In its first judgment, the Court had held that the publication of the applicant’s intimate photographs had “undermined her dignity, conveying a message of humiliation and disrespect”. In addition, this act, along with the impersonation and stalking, had interfered with her enjoyment of her private life, causing her to feel anxiety, distress and insecurity. The State authorities had a responsibility to provide adequate protection measures to the victims of domestic violence in the form of effective deterrence against serious breaches of their physical and psychological integrity. Whereas in a large majority of Council of Europe member States, victims of domestic violence might apply for immediate “restraining” or “protection” orders capable of forestalling the recurrence of domestic violence, Russia was among only a few member States whose national legislation did not provide victims of domestic violence with any comparable measures of protection. Russia had not identified any effective remedies that the authorities could have used to ensure the applicant’s protection against recurrent acts of cyberviolence.
The investigation had been opened late, almost 2 years after the applicant had first reported the fake profiles to the police. Before that, the police had sought to dispose hastily of the matter on formal grounds instead of making a serious and genuine attempt to establish the circumstances of the applicant’s malicious impersonation on social media. Because of the slow-paced investigation into the fake social media profiles, the prosecution eventually became time barred. The criminal case against S. was discontinued by application of the statute of limitations on his initiative, although his involvement in the creation of the fake profiles appeared to have been established. By failing to conduct the proceedings with the requisite diligence, the authorities bore responsibility for their failure to ensure that the perpetrator of acts of cyberviolence is brought to justice. The resulting impunity had been enough to shed doubt on the ability of the State machinery to produce a sufficiently deterrent effect to protect women from cyberviolence.
Consequently, although the existing framework equipped the authorities with legal tools to prosecute the acts of cyberviolence, the manner in which they had handled the matter – notably a reluctance to open a criminal case and a slow pace of the investigation resulting in the perpetrator’s impunity – disclosed a failure to discharge their positive obligations under Article 8 of the Convention.